Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The Conceptual Foundations of a Plan to Reduce Violence and Improve the Quality of Life in a Midsized Community in Jamaica

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I place the economy among the first and most important virtues, and public debt as the greatest danger to be feared.

— Thomas Jefferson

Projection makes perception. The world you see is what you make of it.

Nothing more than that. . . . It is the witness of your state of mind, the outside picture of an inward condition. As a man thinketh, so does he perceive. Therefore, seek not to change the world, but choose to change your mind about the world.

— Anonymous

THOMAS JEFFERSON noted that social ills breed economic ills and vice versa. An endless regress can occur with violence and mayhem as a chorus: Every community in the world has its own thresholds and patterns of violence, and communities experience varied levels of deterioration of safety with a reciprocal increase in violence. The United States, having undergone 200 years of social evolution as an independent nation, has a spiraling problem with violence. Jamaica, with only recent independence from British sovereignty, is an ideal crucible for the study of evolution of violence in a very young democracy and, hopefully, to identify problems and provide some solutions. Having gained independence from British rule in 1962, Jamaica immediately demonstrated a facile experimentation with forms of government that differed dramatically from what had been previously experienced under the rather rigid, autocratic British administration. In its 33 years of independence, this country has gone through some extraordinary shifts. An initial courtship with Communist theory led to a destructive liaison with Fidel Castro's version of Marxism. During

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this brief interlude, the intellectual ideals of equality and peace came into direct contrast with facts of a failing Communist regime. During this period, there was a steady exodus of wealthy Jamaican families for whom heavy taxation threatened financial ruin. The prime minister, the Honorable Michael Manley, a highly sophisticated left-wing intellectual liberal, soon realized the political cost of the alliance with his Caribbean neighbor, Fidel Castro, who was then and is now dedicated to old-fashioned, state-controlled Communism. He attempted to return to a free-market democracy with financial foundations that were, by then, very shaky. To succeed in a project to reduce violence and improve the quality of life, the entire community needs to be involved. From our work in countries where community projects were primarily financed by federal and state agencies, we were aware that the participation of private citizens in projects was essential for success. Commitment has an added intensity when personal time and funding is involved. Prime Minister Manley enthusiastically embraced and inspired this project, believing that it embodied the fundamental principles of democratic involvement to which he was committed. When the authors personally presented their plan to him, he accepted it immediately and with an obvious personal sense of urgency. Illness led him to resign the post of Prime Minister in 1993, but his successor, Mr. P. J. Patterson, has continued in the same committed, democratic mode.

When we first received a call from Mrs. Vanessa Taylor, a prominent citizen of Montego Bay, Jamaica, we realized that a situation existed for community change: A private citizen with the means and skill, both politically and personally, had called to ask for our participation in a project that had emerged from an urgent need existing in the community. Montego Bay had suffered from a sudden and dramatic reduction in tourist economic input, because, as a result of press coverage of the increasing incidents of violence, travel agencies around the world had alerted many visitors to avoid Jamaica as a holiday port. This crisis generated the initial request for help and also created a milieu in which bureaucratic red tape and other stalling procedures that often interrupt the success of a complicated community intervention were minimized. Violence had tempered the boundaries between political parties. Both the Peoples National Party and the Jamaican Labor Party joined hands with the private sector to accommodate this program.

Jamaica has a tourist population of approximately 30,000 visitors per week. It has two worlds: The first world is cultivated to please the visitor. Incoming foreign tourist revenue accounts for a major portion of the available revenue for Jamaica; tourism is included in the major three revenue sources for the entire country at approximately US$1.0 billion per annum. The second world is a network of parishes with three distinct types of communities: (1) large city (e.g., Kingston); (2) midsize towns with tourists, commerce, and manufacturing industries (e.g., Montego Bay); and (3) rural communities (e.g., Orocobesa, a community currently under extensive development by a private corporation). In this paper, we look at Montego Bay, with a population of approximately 125,000 persons, as a town without the devastating, deep, inner-city problems experienced in Kingston. Nevertheless, the community of Montego Bay is beginning to examine itself and is discovering that the small-town problems of 50 years ago have evolved into an increasingly violent community for which a small-town mentality is ineffective. In the United States, Florida may lose tens of millions of dollars...
annually in European tourism as a consequence of highly publicized murders of tourists. Once a tourist-sensitive community acquires the label “violent community,” it suffers as that reputation prevails, especially in the opinion of the consumer-sensitive travel industry.

Next, we devised criteria for the diagnosis of a “violent community” and then arrived at an impression about how closely Montego Bay fit these criteria.

**The Violent Community**

We coined the term “violent community” to describe a community that is observably anti-intellectual and action oriented. Delay and negotiation are often not valued but seen as signs of weakness. The intellectual and compassionate attributes of potentially good leaders are overshadowed by the conflict rhetoric of reactionaries trying to inflame and manipulate the public rather than inform them. In such settings, the citizen is treated as naive and in need of direction from leaders who omnipotently feel they are not required to be specific nor intellectually correct, nor fully accountable for proposals and action plans.

There is a common myth that force can solve problems of disorder, a view that pervades the philosophy of most modern governments, although approaching violence through punishment/surveillance alone has never succeeded in creating a lasting peaceful democracy. Punitive approaches are paradoxically used to “ensure” world peace, for example, stockpiling of arms in an attempt to induce peacefulness by the threat of destruction. As we examined a variety of models to approach the problems seen in Jamaica, we questioned whether this approach had ever really worked. Two countries immediately came to mind: Communist China and Singapore. Singapore has evolved from a country of widespread violence, drug abuse, and prostitution to a very peaceful, clean, and well-organized community. However, military support has been used to enforce “peace.” Recently a colleague who visited Singapore had seen a disheveled and unshaven individual being forced by soldiers to go to the back of a line at a movie theater because he was setting a bad example by his appearance. Communist China has also implemented similar controls of drug abuse and prostitution.

What is the price of this punishment/surveillance approach? The solutions, even if they are effective, make the quality of life and particularly the lack of personal freedom intolerable to those of us accustomed to the freedoms of a democracy. This model attempts to deal with unrest through counterviolence. If this approach is unbalanced—that is, if it does not also involve an equally intense nonviolent initiative—eventually an unstable form of tyranny results.

It seemed clear from working with the police that the community of Montego Bay had an appetite for negative information about the police, with daily newspapers containing an unending litany of stories of police corruption and incompetence. The community often provided the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) with contradictory messages. On the one hand, it seemed to request a punitive response by the police toward criminals. On the other hand, however, the community did not want to see the “ugly faces” of the JCF officers when they were “cracking down.” Over the years, the JCF undertook a number of possibly pathological initiatives to respond to this public outcry. The first of these included a project known as Operation Ardent, a paramilitary-type of operation that teamed the JCF with the professional Jamaican army. This strategy was designed to make the tourists feel more secure and welcomed with a military presence, but it had the opposite effect.

Shortly after Operation Ardent, a new initiative was begun by the government, called ACID. ACID was equipped with sophisticated weaponry for strikes against known high-crime organizations. Both these operations were highly publicized and often had a number of disconcerting
interfaces with both tourists and communities. These SWAT-like initiatives were made possible by the enactment of a law, the Suppression of Crimes in 1974, that gave the JCF very broad powers to search and seize without a warrant. These expensive efforts were predictably unsuccessful in containing violence. Remarkably, they were not counterbalanced with "softer" approaches such as community improvement, health care facilities, etc., which we have found often occur in violent communities, although the act was modified in 1993 with much more limited police powers. In many ways, the punishment/surveillance style of JCF response was partially a throwback to the role of JCF during the colonial period. The primarily White plantation owners apparently expected the social control agent, the JCF, to police themselves with brutality and to engender fear.

From a psychodynamic viewpoint, the violent community approach to crime suffers from the effects of oversimplification. It promotes among the citizens a panic reaction, with uncontrolled fear that interferes with the capacity for the type of thinking that would lead to constructive survival responses (Twemlow 1995a, 1995b). In our opinion, this approach is a complicated form of denial—denial of the impossibility of handling violence by a naive adherence to a simple counterforce model in spite of overwhelming evidence that such a model has not ever succeeded in permanently solving problems. It merely staves off crises.

In summary, there are four fundamental reasons why the punishment/surveillance model fails:

1. **Denial**: The effect of this model is to encourage ordinary citizens to say to themselves that they are not, in fact, criminals nor are they part of the problem; although it is known that under certain circumstances, for example, the extreme stress of warfare, that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen is quite capable of violent responses (Bradshaw et al. 1991). Denial allows the individual to distance oneself from any responsibility for the problem.

2. **Oversimplification**: As we have already observed, a common oversimplification in this model is to reduce the solution to the problem of violence to the elimination of violent individuals with severe legal penalties. For example, it is commonly accepted that the death penalty does not deter violent crime. Jamaica has severe automatic penalties for crimes involving weapons. Paradoxically, according to JCF personnel, a crime involving a gun usually leads to a shootout with a fatality since the felon does not want mandatory life imprisonment. Such shootouts are common in Jamaica even for minor crimes.

3. **Oversimplification**: Sometimes the successful use of force to quell a riot in one circumstance is generalized to the complicated problems of the community. In the United States this has led to extraordinary situations in which small towns have spent enormous amounts of money on sophisticated weaponry without saving enough of the town's budget to train personnel in the use of this weaponry. If one can arm oneself with weaponry surpassing or equal to that of the sophisticated aggressor, then one feels safe.

4. **Stereotypy**: In the martial arts there is a truism that admonishes the fighter to never underestimate the enemy. Military training often emphasizes the skill and strength of the individual, and the incompetence and ineptness of the enemy, and has often led to an underestimation of the enemy. Continuing the use of force when it does not work often results in the failure to observe how stereotyped response patterns are not useful, sometimes due to an underlying contempt of the enemy. In Jamaica there is also the possible artifact of the racial bias of the colonial lawmakers.

The action-oriented, anti-intellectual stance that we hypothesize defines a violent community is reminiscent of Bion's 1959 description of the fight/flight basic
assumption, which he felt often operated in small groups. Cooperative “work group” approaches for solving community problems then become devalued. The more advanced human functions of self-reflection and abstract learning have given us the ability to evolve beyond primitive, reactive fight/flight responses into a more proactive pattern. This phenomenon parallels development in children, who evolve from more self-centered, impulsive, concrete beings to more abstract entities capable of delayed gratification, reflection, abstract thinking, and logic in problem solving. As we have proposed, a reactive “fight/flight” response can result in an escapist, violence-glorifying community philosophy that values substance abuse and killing above thoughtful reflection, altruism, or proactive planning.

Although Bion’s work was at first focused on small groups, initially veterans of World War II, he was open-minded and interested in the application of his ideas to large groups (Bion 1959, p. 112-113). Freud (1920) studied much larger groups, more particularly the functioning of the church and the military. He observed that such large groups exert a contagious effect on other groups and on their members, who become suggestible. Often there is a submersion of the critical facility of individuals to a group agenda resulting in impulsivity, a loss of the search for the truth, and an increase in affective pitch. The psychiatric literature abounds with research studies on how groups remain cohesive, work oriented, and rational (e.g., Yalom 1985). Some, McDougall (1920), for example, concluded that to be cohesive, groups must have continuity, a tradition, and a definite structure. The individual must understand how the group works and the group must recognize that other groups are equally valid.

Freud (1920) also observed that group members often subjugate their own personal goals to the ideals of their leader. Although today other factors are recognized as relevant to group functions, the central role of a leadership is the unique contribution of psychoanalytic authors in this field. Bion (1959) concluded that small groups search for three types of leaders: a caring and reliable leader (dependency assumption); a frightening and ruthless leader who acts rather than thinks (fight/flight assumption); and thirdly, a messianic, omnipotent leader who will solve problems in his/her own unique way and in a way that does not need to be understood by the members of the group (pairing assumption), as in cults. From our observations, at different times communities also react in these various ways toward their leaders. The mindless subjugation of individual ego ideals to the whims of the leader that was so eloquently described by Freud (1920) seems, on the face of it, to forecast a special case of Bion’s fight/flight assumption we have called a “violent community” response. This idea was central to the intervention since once the community diagnosis was made, the team then focused its activities on retraining leaders to think before acting and to reflect and care—all antithetical to the values inherent in violent communities.

From our observations, a violent community often becomes fragmented along lines of difference in socioeconomic status, race, culture, geography, or political affiliation. Elements within the community resort to conflict to achieve their objectives rather than the more efficient “work group” model of solving shared problems (Bion 1959). The partnerships developed tend to be corrupt and self-interested. Common community goals fade and individual narcissistic interests emerge as dominant motivators for community action, well illustrated by open conflict between JCF and community leaders, blaming the other for the atrocious conditions in the community.

Violent communities, we feel, also tend to have limited resources combined with dwindling positive alternatives. For example, in the United States, minority males living in large, industrialized cities might find it difficult to see alternatives to the short-term gains of drug dealing or organized gang criminal activity. Without job training and placement programs, the
violent community develops "violence centers" or gangs that exist to provide alliance, protection, and access to resources. This evolution is accelerated as the community moves away from self-sufficiency and becomes more industrialized, commercialized, and dominated by narcissistic oligarchies. Organized crime and gangs were a recognized problem throughout Jamaica.

In violent communities, altruists are usually viewed as soft and naive. Simply helping others is seen as a waste of time and a sign of weakness. The church can become a place for only the old and the dependent young. But, in fact, the religious community in its idealism often becomes the "brokerage agent" for altruism. Church-sponsored activities may attempt to feed the hungry, shelter the homeless, and protect the vulnerable. Without these interventions, violent communities like Montego Bay become cold environments because of the lack of warmth generated from group altruistic behavior and fail to care for the helpless and vulnerable. When abandoned children are abused and starved, or older people are left to die, the entire community is diminished and suffers as a result, as evidenced by limited entitlement programs and facilities to care for the indigent.

Violent communities also often suffer a desperate lack of positive male role models, a problem shared by both the United States and Jamaica. The ancient father/son hunting relationship is the prototype of how skills and many altruistic values were transmitted daily with the shared duty to survive. Ancient hunters/warriors were known as the prototype sharers of resources (Fields 1991). When a big kill was made, the brave and victorious slayer of the prey took some for himself and then dutifully ensured that all benefited from the meat. Hoarding and storing to the detriment of others created competition for the limited resources. As larger numbers of the people stopped hunting, agrarian societies have evolved into large complex communities (cities). Positive male models are pitted against strong negative male models. The strong negative male recruits young men to fight and provide access to criminal activities, rewarding them with the feeling of belonging to a safe and powerful group, as well as money, protection, and social status. The positive male role model—often a police officer, doctor, minister, teacher, or other community activist—thus has to compete with forces that are highly passionate and motivated, often with more exciting and hedonistic satisfactions.

A violent community is also a highly stressful environment. Positive sublimations are few and survival stress is high. Hopelessness and escapism increase. Drug and alcohol abuse flourish and become universally accepted as means to self-medicate against unendurable, psychological pain; for example, most police stations in Jamaica had a fully equipped bar to provide alcohol to assist police in handling stress. Athletic facilities are often vandalized and covered with graffiti; they become less connected to the community and are the first to be eliminated during economic crisis. In our view, they should be the very last to go. Violent communities thus lose this unifying experience of team building. The community fails to reinvest in the human infrastructure and environment.

We concluded from field observations, a questionnaire about crime and working conditions given to 100 JCF personnel, and from detailed analyses of news reports, crime statistics, and available official government opinion, that Montego Bay fitted the criteria for the diagnosis of violent community.

CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON

Before creating the specific interventions for this violent community, we took note of several cultural differences be-
tween Jamaica and the United States that might affect the nature and effectiveness of any program. There are striking differences in the roles of men and women in Jamaica; for example, in the percentage of women who are police officers—some 20% or more, compared to single-digit figures in the United States. At the same time, although women appear to be generally assertive, male chauvinistic roles seem entrenched in the day-to-day, husband/wife relationships, with men often being violent and conjugal rape common. Jamaica is also a nation that has no formal entitlement programs for financial aid, other than healthy child care for children up to age 15 months. There is no formal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) equivalent. There is a Women, Infant, and Children (WIC) program that provides minimal foodstuffs for younger mothers until their babies are 15 months of age. Jamaica is similar to the United States approximately 40 years ago in their attitude toward teenage pregnancy. Young women who become pregnant while in junior high or high school are not welcomed at school and experience significant rejection by their families and home communities.

During 10 years of visiting and working with Jamaican schoolchildren, we have observed through hundreds of conversations that Jamaican children have a much different attitude toward education than do American youth. In almost every case, a Jamaican child is highly motivated to pursue an education. Actually, education is seen as the sole road to economic security. Even in homes for delinquent youth, the children still value education and welcome the opportunity to absorb information that is available. This attitude remains fixed throughout the Jamaican’s life cycle. When the intervention team provided workshops for the JCF, all the faculty marveled at how intensely focused, energetic, and absorbent these very undereducated, poorly paid Jamaican police officers were. In the United States there is often a built-in adversarial relationship between school and home because of the "them and us" approach of meetings between parents and school required as part of education law. In Jamaica, authority is far less questioned. Parents usually do not engage in ongoing conflict with the school concerning strong disciplinary action with their children. They more often cooperate with the school and police around discipline issues. It was virtually unheard of to have a parent take legal action against a school concerning harsh disciplinary action against their child. It is clear that Jamaicans value education, devalue entitlement of financial aid, and prefer simple social systems over more complex systems. It is this latter fact that has made our intervention much easier than it might be in the United States (Twemlow and Sacco 1994).

THE COMMUNITY PEACEKEEPER AND PEACEMAKER

Our next task was to devise a method to move Montego Bay away from its anti-intellectual, action-oriented violent community posture to a more reflective, compassionate, and tolerant community. Even more daunting was how to do this without grants and with the very limited finances provided by private citizens. In line with the psychoanalytic principles governing the critical role of leadership in group dynamics, we focused on altering attitudes of selected community leaders and seeding them into the community, hoping for a mushrooming, catalytic effect. To achieve this we created the concept of the community peacekeeper/peacemaker. The peacekeeper functions to defuse crises and deal with emergency situations necessary to prevent the physical sequelae of violence, transitioning to peacemaker, whose role is to create the conditions necessary for a lasting nonviolent and creative community atmosphere. These peacekeeper/peacemakers were selected from groups that we defined as critical to peacefulness and the quality of life in the communities. Rather than treating the symptoms of community disorganiza-
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

...tion (such as disease, child abuse, etc.), we attempted to get to the fundamental cause of the disorganization. This had to do, in our minds, with the failure to provide an effective mechanism for preserving community cohesion and to develop a feeling of safety within the community. We felt that the stability of a community is largely dependent on four major community systems: law and order, education, health, and spirituality. These four community roles embody the heart and soul of a functioning community. When any of these four areas becomes "infected" with violence, there is a weakening of the overall community's ability to decrease impulsivity and increase positive community action.

Law and Order

Law and order is maintained through the traditional social control element of the police and military. In most successful nonviolent communities, the police and military serve only as a last-resort measure to control crime and violence in the community.

Spirituality

The internal control of the community is enhanced through the spiritual rootedness of the members of the community in various altruistic organizations such as the church. In choosing peacekeepers, it was clear that there was a strong relationship between the JCF and the ministry, with a need for the police and the various community organizations to work collaboratively on altruistic projects. This began to occur when JCF officers evolved projects that were purely altruistic. The most notable of these was the evolution of the role of the JCF officer as outreach street workers assisting the homeless and mentally ill.

Education

Education is the lifeblood of any community. When violence begins to reduce a community's fundamental structures to anarchy, the most dramatic signs can often be seen in the schools. In Montego Bay, violence was a daily occurrence at the Montego Bay Secondary School. This shroud of violence was creating a sense of despair and a lack of interest or opportunity for effective learning and teaching. Teachers and students felt unsafe and bullies ran the school. It was imperative for the JCF to work collaboratively with the intervention team, schoolteachers, and local community sponsors to develop programs that would reduce the violence at the school. When the schools are violent, the community is fed more and more bullies, and the overall long-term evolution of the community is directed toward increased violence.

Health and Nutrition

The last element of a nonviolent community concerns the proper health and nutrition of its citizens. With few exceptions, the Jamaican citizenry relied mostly on private medical care. The social welfare system was essentially developed and implemented informally by the JCF, who were solely responsible for picking up abandoned children. Entitlement programs were virtually nonexistent. The Family Court was responsible for most probate decisions relating to child abuse, neglect, and abandonment. Unfortunately, public health and recreation also are primary targets for reduction when financial resources become slim. This reduction in health focus further adds fuel to the violent community evolution.

The JCF were the group we selected first for such training, because they were under the greatest pressure to change. Ministers were already part of the daily work of police as their spiritual guides and counselors. Later, schoolteachers and students participated, and finally, involvement of the medical community through our workers in child care and mental health programs. To achieve these objectives, clearly a comprehensive leadership training program was needed.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1963) in his idealistic philosophy once said that the leaders in his utopia should be "Roman Caesars with Christ's soul." Nietzsche's ideal leader became an integral part of the leadership training for the peacekeeper/peacemaker initiative. The central characteristics of such a person is a sort of gentle ferocity, an outrage against cruelty. Ancient examples include the feared Samurai warriors of Japan, who lived by the Bushido Code of Conduct, which is very similar in tone to the precepts of knighthood of the medieval English knight. Both groups reflected ideals that stressed the protection of the weak by the strong, powerful, and gentle warrior. This model espouses the view that violence is reduced when a cross section of the community "become warriors with gentle souls." Clearly such training involves physical instruction, provided in our program by martial artists and police combat and safety experts, and ethical instruction provided by the staff.

Individuals who have lived in this century also inspired our choice of model. Mahatma Ghandi, a British-trained attorney, devised a form of nonviolent resistance, first, by dealing with apartheid in South Africa. He then achieved a revolution in India using a form of strong and courageous resistance to the violent oppression of the British. This was not pacifism in the sense of surrender but an aggressive tolerance of violence. In his speeches, Ghandi constantly spoke of the need to stand up for one's principles but not to degenerate to the level of degraded violent reaction. Ghandi was a model for Martin Luther King, Jr., whose nonviolent activities in the civil rights movement of the 1960s are part of American history. More recently the championship of Cesar Chavez, who exposed the plight of vineyard workers in California, was also influenced by such principles.

Social psychology teaches that working together on a common goal can bring different groups together and improve the images of each side for the other. When one works with someone on a goal of mutual advantage to each party's survival, then, both sides assess each other more positively. Violence should be the enemy against which the community partners join together to confront. In contrast to the violent community, the peacekeeper alternative stresses cooperation between various groups in the community to end violence and to build alternatives to force. This model learns from history that permanent peace cannot be achieved through force and oppression. Peaceful coexistence is the only long-term solution.

Historically, the raw strength and aggressiveness of the warrior was tempered with rigorous, intellectual training in the softer arts such as philosophy, music, poetry, painting, etc. The warrior would have to adopt a more gentle stance to master these arts. We did not deem this pragmatic in this setting nor appropriate for our goals. For training, instead we decided to use a more psychological approach derived from two main sources: the study of Zen, particularly its principles, and the available information on human altruism. The history of Zen Buddhism is a history of nonviolence (Rahula 1959). This model of nonviolence involves a number of precepts that were woven into the peacekeeper training, not as explicit training in Buddhist theory but as a context within which the interventions were offered. Thus, a Code of Conduct was developed for the Peacekeeper/Peacemaker (Table 1). The training shows that the peacekeeper has a primary role as protector for the community; and the peacemaker, as a synthesizer and constructor of peace-promoting community programs. The ethics of the Bushido Code of Conduct woven into the Peacekeeper/Peacemaker Code (Deshimaru 1982, Heckler 1985; Nitobe 1969) emphasizes self-control, courage, politeness, truthfulness, honesty, sincerity, benevolence, justice, honor, and loyalty.

The psychology of Zen—particularly its emphasis on nonviolence, mental clarity, compassion, and personal responsibility for one's actions and their consequences—
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

Table 1

The Peacekeeper/Peacemaker Code of Conduct

The peacekeeper and peacemaker:
1. "Enforces" peace nonviolently with courage and self-confidence, and if force is necessary, uses the least injurious strategy possible.
2. Values relationships with others and is more altruistic than self-centered.
3. Is committed to peace, kindness, and protecting others from harm.
4. Shows humility, accepts difference in others, and is not judgmental.
5. Is a leader and role model who takes initiative to better the community.
6. Is mentally alert and mindful, and acts swiftly and effectively when appropriate.
7. Is physically and mentally healthy and flexible.
8. Is able to overcome fear by self-awareness and self-control.
10. Has a commitment to seek new knowledge and to maintain the knowledge necessary to keep this code.

was considered by us to be helpful for the peacekeeper/peacemaker model (Jones 1989; Rahula 1959; Suzuki 1961). As one Samurai said, "The human heart, when perfectly placid and clear, reflects the very image of the deity." The basic principles we focused on are embodied in the following set of statements:

1. That paying attention to the present moment allows expanded self-awareness, efficiency, and effectiveness.
2. That the world functions according to the way one lives in it and conceptualizes it.
3. That one's views of the world largely determine the goodness and badness of things external to us, thus contributing greatly to the perception of "the enemy."
4. That all events eventually pass (principle of impermanence); thus realization of the transience of all events allows one to feel less trapped and to feel less attached and possessive, especially of material possessions. The idea that individuals create their own universe, which eventually passes, and the apparently alien external world is a reflection of oneself, leads also to a more gentle and interpersonal attitude to conflict.
5. Happiness is considered to come from self-knowledge, not from adherence to dogmas or doctrines.

This model describes a certain type of police officer, a presence that requires a strong commitment to community and an emphasis on community involvement rather than simply crime stopping or prowling around the outside of the community. The Montego Bay project is built on the foundation of an enlightened police effort to become peacekeepers. This, in our opinion, is essential to the long-term success of any nonviolence program. Gentleness increases as the martial skill and intensity grows and becomes more focused.

HUMAN ALTRUISM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGGRESSION

We knew that there needed to be a deeper understanding of psychology by the JCF trainees because so much of human behavior is unconsciously motivated. The view that violence is inevitable is quite popular in the psychoanalytic community (Volkan 1985). For example, war is seen as a discharge of bad parts of the self (bad self-representations) into the containing enemy, which becomes all bad. This view of the human condition has led to a model in which violent impulses can be sublimated instead of acted out destructively. Sublimation is seen as another way of defusing the destructiveness of the impulse to violence into a more constructive activity. Community systems have long been built, directly or indirectly, upon such models. New opportunities for development of business, for cleaning up of ghettos, for better educational opportu-
nities, for aggressive recreational activities and so on, are forms of sublimation.

To this model we added some additional views of the role of aggression and altruism in the development of the self. The psychology of this view of the human condition distinguishes between the physical and psychological experiencer. The physical experiencer is, in fact, the body before it begins to think about itself, what has been called the prereflective self (Fonagy et al. 1993); and the part of the self that is reflective (i.e., thinks before it acts), or a psychological self, develops later. When an individual is brought up in an environment in which aggression is used as a means of communication, aggression will frequently be invoked as a defense. Since the object of love is often unpredictably violent, the reflective or psychological function of the self is not adequately established, and aggression is used as an organizing influence in the later, more mature, adult self. Thus, instead of using empathy in relationships, pathological destructiveness can occur in response to intimacy. From this point of view, the idea of the role of aggression is not merely a reaction to a developmental defect or frustration but the invocation of a learned influence and has a defensive function in the organization of the self. Thus, we began to see that an understanding of aggression necessitates training in a reflective rather than an action-oriented mode of thinking to enhance other ways to express oneself. This melded well with the models already described for the violent community of Montego Bay.

In a preview of subsequently published findings by Shapiro and Gabbard (1994), altruism was defined as “a behavior designed to meet the needs of others, but is not limited to motivations for personal gain or self-interest.” The authors extensively reviewed the literature from the fields of ethology, infant research, and experimental psychology, and suggested the existence of an independently motivated altruism that is nondefensive in nature. In another research finding, Batson (1991) saw altruism as part of normal human development. To be called altruism, the main goal is not self-benefit but to be of benefit to others. Batson’s (1991) research also indicated that altruism produces a feeling of relaxation and reduced proneness to coronary artery blockage.

Altruism has also been observed in the animal kingdom; for example, whales will support a sick member of the school above water by forming a ring of life support. Shapiro and Gabbard’s review gave us some clues about how to motivate true altruistic behavior. First of all, in the extensive studies in which an acute crisis situation occurred and immediate help was needed to save a life, the majority of individuals in most studies would respond immediately in a helping way. Interestingly, when given time to think, however, the percentage of altruistic responses would drop dramatically as though tamed by the reality of the risk. This dramatic drop implies that the individual must be able to perceive accurately the urgent need of the victim (a form of empathy). Pathology in the individual that might make them self-centered or narcissistic creates more self-interest than altruism. We felt that for efforts toward peace to be enduringly successful, we also needed to train peacekeepers/peacemakers to motivate altruistic impulses that we felt were present in all individuals. The Code of Conduct (see Table 1) was the foundation of this form of leadership training.

In summary, the multilevel series of community interventions (to be described) evolved, by convergent operations, from a variety of apparently disparate sources. A comprehensive leadership training system was developed with a set of community programs to exemplify the potential and effectiveness of these leaders. Table 2 is a schematic summary of the methodol-

1Personal communication with Glen O. Gabbard, MD.

STUART W. TWEMLOW AND FRANK C. SACCO
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

ogy of this study, elaborated in detail in the text.

THE INTERVENTION IN MONTEGO BAY

The project began as an offshoot of a private United States seminar group offering training to psychotherapists conducted as vacation seminars in Montego Bay. These seminars were always made available gratis to any Jamaican willing to participate. As a result of the contacts made during this time, the authors were approached by prominent private citizens and asked to look into the problem of growing violence in the community of Montego Bay and the problems caused by a high level of conflict between the citizens and the police, including a reduction in income from tourism. The police were seen as "trigger happy" and were hated and feared, and considered corrupt by citizens, who called them "animals." This public image of the JCF contrasts with a previous high level of respect for the police force both at home and abroad in the recent past.6

In summary, during our initial assessment visits, the intervention team observed the following about the Montego Bay community:

1. A high incidence and community acceptance of violence toward women. Rape, including conjugal rape, was a commonplace occurrence.
2. A high incidence of childhood infection with sexually transmitted diseases (STD). Peace Corps social work volunteers reported 30 cases per month of STD in children under 12 years of age.
3. Increasing cases of child abandonment and decreasing resources to respond to these children, especially their social and emotional development.
4. High police and citizen tension, with low police/tourist conflict and very little dialogue between the community and the police. A high incidence of police brutality and corruption was reported in the media.
5. Very high levels of stress among police officers,7 due to extremely poor working conditions, lack of adequate training, and woefully inadequate equipment.
6. A high incidence of in-school assaults and students carrying weapons.

Specifically, the violence reduction project had these main goals:

1. Create peacekeepers/peacemakers as ongoing community role models
2. Increase altruism in the community
3. Decrease violence in the community
4. Increase positive "work groups" in the community to develop new and innovative solutions to shared problems
5. Increase tourist safety
6. De-stress and energize the police
7. Increase the skills of the police
8. Decrease acceptance of conjugal rape and domestic abuse
9. Improve child welfare for abandoned children

TRAINING AND CONSULTATION TECHNIQUES

The intervention began with a week-long seminar for 75 Area I JCF police8 in February of 1992, with five seminars at four-month intervals since then and a total of 100 hours of direct training. The training team was multidisciplinary, led by the authors and also including specialists from the fields of social work, law enforcement, psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, and martial arts. Each intervention team was chaired by one of the

7In a self-administered questionnaire evaluation, 30% of JCF were highly susceptible to physical illness and had a poor self-concept, i.e., are at high risk for physical and psychiatric illness.
8The voluntary participants were mainly veterans of the force with an average of 10-12 years experience. We had a 95% return rate of these officers to subsequent seminars.
# Table 2

## A Seven-Step Flow Chart for Community Growth

### STEP I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data gathering</th>
<th>Theory:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fight/Flight Assumption with anti-intellectual action-oriented leadership</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Punishment/surveillance approach to law and order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Community fragmentation; socioeconomic, political and racial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Increased crime and corruption of community leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Altruism seen as weak and naive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lack of positive male role models.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. High stress, few healthy sublimations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### STEP II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community diagnosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent community. Diagnosis established</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### STEP III: Make Contact with Key Personnel from Listed Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification of community stabilizing systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirituality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### STEP IV: Peacekeeper/Peacemaker Training

**Guiding principles:**

- Leaders catalyze large-group change by identification
- Common goals help cohesiveness and reduces community violence
- Leaders should be strong and gentle
- Mental clarity, self-awareness, present centeredness and personal responsibility
- Sublimations reduce impulsivity
- Reflective self is enhanced by self-awareness and role modeling
- Altruistic impulses can motivate change in individuals and community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychoanalytic group theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology and psychoanalytic theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushido training and theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zen theory and practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychoanalytic ego psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoanalytic object relations theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature on altruism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### STEP V: Principle Is That Community Leaders Will Catalyze Change in the Quality of Life in the Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community area:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighting community groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeless and indigent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and homeless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change factor:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Engineered conflict&quot; community forums to resolve differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiviolence and self-care programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection and care programs for orphans and abused women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection and community cleanup with beautification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in effective nonviolent alternatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### STEP VI

- Improve conditions of employment and status of peacemaker/peacekeeper.
- Continue regular supervision and training over several years.
- Transfer training of personnel to local authorities as quickly as possible.
- Faculty function as low-profile advocates. Credit goes to local community activists where possible.

### STEP VII

- Development of measure of community violence and growth.
- Ongoing review of the "violent community" diagnosis.
authors. The teams consisted of 10 trainers who provided formal sessions to the police in the morning and worked in the various community projects in the afternoons. The team chairman was responsible for the direction of field operations while on the island and routinely held morning planning and strategy sessions as well as evening debriefing and problem-solving sessions. The intervention included five components: (1) police skills training including leadership and ethics training; (2) community forums with police, teachers, and citizens; (3) nonlethal physical skills training; (4) community project development including mental health consultation and training of teachers and students in the psychology of conflict, conflict mediation, and self-defense; and (5) public relations and government consultation.

The chairman of each intervention team was also responsible for public and government relations duties. There were ongoing radio and television interviews, press conferences, and appearances at community activities. The team seized every opportunity to appear in the public arena as a way to create a more positive image for the peacekeepers/peacemakers.

Fifty to 75 hours of medical and psychological consultation were provided at Blossom Garden Children's Orphanage. The teams continued to solicit medical and recreational supplies in the United States for use at the orphanage.

Our team provided 50 hours of consultation with Community Uplifting of the Mentally Ill (CUMI). As a result of the intervention, the JCF became active in cooperating with CUMI in rounding up the homeless mentally ill once a week for a change of clothes, a meal, and some basic medical care. A multidisciplinary team of a child psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker met with the clients and CUMI's staff and volunteers. The team also provided basic instruction on the skills needed to work with the mentally ill.

Seventy-five to 100 hours of consultation was provided to Women, Inc., Montego Bay's first private program for domestic violence. The team designed a simple intake procedure for domestic violence cases, provided rape kits for forensic evidence gathering, funded a staff person, trained staff, and offered ongoing phone and fax consultation for two years. The team also developed a critical link between Women, Inc., and the JCF. Domestic violence workers at Women, Inc., began to receive regular backup and support from the JCF, eventually resulting in the JCF assigning two female officers to a local hospital and an outstation to respond to rape cases. Previously, victimized women were only able to make reports to all-male staffs in deplorable barracks-style police stations. The team also made regular appearances on radio to challenge the cultural myth that violence toward women was a culturally acceptable norm.

Community discord was addressed with a mechanism described as "engineered conflict." A series of community forums were established between members of the community who disagree over both defining and solving problems. Engineered conflict is designed as a mechanism to induce

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Footnotes:

9DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) is a police-administered U.S. program to provide information and to set positive examples for elementary schoolchildren.

10A term coined by Dan Peterson, PhD, research consultant to this project.
change in antagonistic social groups. The goal of engineered conflict is the reduction of intergroup conflict by intentionally provoking a controlled form of conflict between members of the opposing social groups. The engineered conflict is managed in a process that allows the exploration of common values and shared concerns for positive social change. Hostility and oppositional values are resolved between groups in a process of mediated dialogue. The fundamental psychological assumption of this method is that people are fundamentally more the same than different, and that differences between individuals are always reduced as anger and feelings of being misunderstood are ameliorated.

The moderators of these engineered conflict community forums use a traveling microphone to get groups talking with each other. At first, differences are highlighted and gradually the groups are brought to a common ground of shared problems and, more particularly, their shared interest in solving those problems to their mutual benefit. Engineered conflict is conducted in an atmosphere of support and understanding. These forums became a tool in reshaping the public image of the JCF. For example, in one forum, citizens complained of police misconduct and police complained about the community’s lack of appreciation for the conditions under which they worked. The media became more positively interested in the JCF, who received media coverage of their achievements as well as the “poor working conditions.” Citizens became aware of the fact that many police were accustomed to taking taxis or buses to the scene of the crime due to nonavailability of police cars, and the JCF officers worked without the benefit of two-way radios. The JCF were also recognized for their role in rescuing abandoned children.

A special ongoing section was devoted to police stress and suicide. Police often cope with stress by using alcohol, with most police stations having a bar providing alcohol to officers on duty. The JCF struggled valiantly under the pressures of low pay, unbelievably meager resources (especially communication and transportation), and little ongoing professional development for line officers. Specially designed meditation and visualization tapes were distributed to all officers in the training for daily mindfulness practice, with every training session focusing some attention on the topic of stress management.

The team also provided training in non-lethal forms of physical control as an alternative to the handgun. Far too many documented instances of police using lethal force existed, with a lack of training in alternatives considered to be a large contributing factor. This physical training included stretching and other conditioning practices: restraint, escape, and self-defense techniques derived from martial arts; and training in use of handcuffs and baton from police experts and martial artists to assist in a healthier approach.

Rape prevention training was also offered to female police officers, schoolteachers, and students, using pads, shields, and the “padded attacker” simulation techniques. The JCF officers practiced simple verbal techniques to use in rape situations. These tactics were designed to be simple to learn and to teach.

Each seminar was designed to allow for the police involved to apply their skills in the community of Montego Bay after the training team had left. Some of the programs sought to strengthen the role of the JCF in community programs while other programs provided more straightforward medical assistance to abandoned children. The community development component involved the team’s visiting schools, community programs, and recreation clubs.

The purpose of these consultations was to provide the necessary technical information to seed programs that reflected the peacekeeping/peacemaking model. The programs were the concrete theaters within which the peacemakers could work to provide the role modeling and services required to sustain the effects of the intervention.
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

RESULTING GROWTH OF COMMUNITY PROGRAMS

Since February 1992 there has been an expansion of a number of programs that feature the peacekeeper/peacemaker initiative:

Rape and Domestic Violence Prevention

Women, Inc., has expanded and now has a positive relationship with the JCF. Prior to the intervention, the JCF were not involved with the program. The first seminar bridged this gap and successfully created an active working relationship with the JCF and Women, Inc., with JCF officers volunteering their time at Women, Inc. Since this rapprochement, Women, Inc., staff have reported few working difficulties with JCF. The faculty pooled enough personal resources to fund an additional staff position at Women, Inc., for one year, which allowed for the expansion of the first private program for rape and domestic violence prevention in Montego Bay. Again, the role of altruism was modeled. The community took over the funding of a permanent position before the year was finished.

School Violence Prevention

The JCF placed an officer, trained in our seminars, at the Montego Bay Secondary School, which has 2400 students. The school was experiencing a horrifying increase of student violence. Teacher and student assaults with knives and ice picks were a regular occurrence. The JCF officer embarked on a two-part intervention supported by the faculty. The first element involved daily searches and a clear authority message enforced by the JCF officer that weapons were not to be tolerated. The second element was an honor group formed at the school to assist the officer and designed to attract and reform a core group of ex-bullies into leadership roles.

The intervention was gratifyingly successful. The teachers and students reported that the JCF officer, nicknamed "Bruno," had "calmed down" the school considerably in a very short period of time, with students reporting feeling safe at school. The principal and teachers called for an expansion of the role of the JCF in daily school activities. Local businesses sponsored art contests and funded other recreational activities. For example, the team solicited donations for soccer balls. A clubhouse featured groups led by the JCF officers on topics that included driving a car, drug abuse, violence, and proper conduct in public (i.e., many parental functions). This school program is reported in detail elsewhere (Sacco and Twemlow 1995).

Community Mental Health Programs

The JCF began working with the homeless mentally ill, a fine example of altruism in action. Community Uplifting of the Mentally Ill is a private group with a day-treatment approach to caring for the mentally ill. Under the direction of a JCF inspector, the police, on their own time, began to "round up" the homeless mentally ill and take them to CUMI for baths, food, and new clothes, often personally performing or supervising the process. This partnership continues to grow and has been very effective in controlling the problem of the homeless mentally ill. The intervention team created a core group of doctors and psychologists who regularly consult and raise donations of medical supplies and medications for CUMI, the Westhaven Children's Home, and Blossom Gardens home for abandoned children. The consulting teams work with community volunteers to develop programs for the children and the clients of CUMI. Community education groups were developed both at CUMI and Westhaven to inform the public of the problem and enlist their support as volunteers. For example, one of us observed a truckload of teenage boys, who regularly visit Blossom Gardens, arriving just to play with these abandoned children. This is an example of how peacemakers are modeled among younger members of the community.
Community Education

Twelve JCF female officers were intensively trained as Rape Prevention Teachers. They are prepared to go out into the community and teach mental and physical techniques for rape prevention and survival. A full schedule for the utility of this program has yet to be developed and is a top priority for future development.

A new youth group was developed by the JCF in Great River. The JCF act as role models and organize these groups into teams to create positive recreational and entertainment options for the local youth. The intervention team visited this new club and pledged its support for the future. The intervention team sparked interest in creating a collaboration between DARE America and the JCF. The Montego Bay business community raised money to allow two JCF officers to come to the United States and be trained as DARE officers. Now, Jamaica has the ability to extend the DARE programs to its students. Plans are now in the making to bring the DARE training to Jamaica on a national level.

Police Training and Attitudes

One major effect on police not realized at the onset was the importance of harnessing the impulse to altruism, especially in the downtrodden JCF officers. For example, the officers who provided assistance to CUMI did so on their own time and have observed an increase in cooperativeness of the citizens, who see them as more humane. One of us accompanied a policeman on a tour of the poorer parts of the city. People came to visit with him with expressions of affection, proudly showing him their children, etc. He had worked in a secondary school. As we drove back, he remarked, with a beaming smile creasing his usually tense face, "It sure beats being spat on and shot at!"

Another officer was on duty one evening after brief basic ethical and martial arts training in the first seminar. While patrolling, he was attacked by a drunken man running amok with a machete. As he reached for his gun, he remembered the training and instead of killing the man, he talked him down and then disarmed him. The man had become very upset because he had discovered his wife in bed with another man and he had gone on a drunk to ameliorate the pain. The policeman felt pleased he hadn't shot him because he empathized and didn't consider the individual a bad man. The community responded positively to this nonviolent response with a more helpful subsequent attitude to this policeman's work in the community.

As a result of the team's negotiations with local and national levels of government, several significant changes in police training have occurred. A community policing program has been instituted in a model reminiscent of conditions in Jamaica decades before but modernized to include our recommendations for peacekeeper/peacemaker training; it resembles modern research and experience, especially in Canada. In addition:

- There have been significant pay increases for JCF personnel.
- Moonlighting for JCF off duty as security personnel has been allowed, which improves income and thus reduces the temptation of corruption.
- Alcohol has been eliminated from police stations and barracks, with increased recognition of alcoholism and stress in police.
- JCF are trained centrally and then sent to the various parishes for varying periods. We recommended that JCF introduce a policy of stabilizing a selected group of officers to train together for three years without transfer. This, we felt, would help reduce police stress by allowing family stabilization for the policemen. This recommendation was accepted in principle, and we see it as an urgent necessity for the future.

Besides the community programs that are ongoing, expanding the project in Montego Bay has visible results for the
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

overall community (Twemlow and Sacco 1994). Early impact of the study has been reported to produce a 10% increase in tourism with a crime-free Montego Bay Christmas season in 1992, and a 64% decrease in reported violent crime in the St. James parish.

These figures, although heartening, are incomplete because crime statistics in general are neither systematically reported nor collected accurately. Any future studies we make will involve assisting the police to set up procedures for accurate statistical monitoring of crime. The most reliable and lasting results of the program are the community programs.

THE PEACEKEEPER CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE

A number of problems cloud an accurate assessment of any lasting results:

1. There is a lack of continuity in program development and objective measurement and assessment of outcome. The project has no day-to-day project coordination.

2. Although the program has the full support of the current government and was enthusiastically attended and supported by the police, the project failed to fully implement the involvement of key local JCF community relations personnel. This was especially true in the selection of officers for DARE and other exchange programs.

3. The problems at the Montego Bay Secondary School were controlled while a special officer was assigned, but violence returned upon the JCF officer’s resignation. This points to the necessity of specially selecting and training an officer who can use the principles of the seminars within an already existing peacemaker mentality to deliver the double-pronged approach of social control and recreational involvement in the life of youths.

4. Most of the program deficiencies can be traced to a lack of long-term funding necessary to develop the program. There needs to be an ongoing presence on the island and a budget that supports the necessary management and tools for adequate data collection and program oversight. Most professional staff were volunteers, although their expenses were paid. Retrospectively, however, paid staff can create problems. They work for money and their motivation may become materialistic. We were struck by the degree by which largely volunteer faculty were interested in returning for further work in Jamaica in spite of not being paid beyond expenses. Actually, unpaid volunteer professional faculty are often motivated by their wish to help and thus become better role models for altruism. High personal motivation is critical, in our opinion, to the development of effective community programs. So often, federal and state funding programs fail because personal investment in the outcome is limited by lack of staff enthusiasm and feelings of hopelessness that are often created by endless administrative problems. Personal satisfaction derived from training enthusiastic volunteers and seeing results of their work is blurred and clouded for them by the layers of administrative complexities.

As the peacekeepers/peacemakers were successful in role modeling, the community shifted to a spiral of caring. As violence begets violence, similarly, caring begets caring. This model offers interventions for violence reduction that can be applied almost anywhere. There could be little support for an argument that the principles of this program could not be successfully applied in an American or European city, since they are simple and founded on basic transcultural sociological and psychological concepts. The project did not require major sums of money.

Acknowledged by Kirky Taylor, Esq., lawyer and Montego Bay businessman.
and was built on an expanding base of community altruism and sharing of resources stimulated by urgent economic need. The key element of the program was the identification of peacekeeper trainees and the subsequent investment in the training and placement of these special community leaders. Every community has such people.

Future goals include working with the tourism industry to help create a special force for use in keeping tourists safe, happy, and spending. There is a need to further expand and involve schoolteachers, physicians, and the religious community leaders as recruits to the peacekeeper/peacemaker model. The intervention team foresees a three-year span of further development before the team can simply assume an ongoing consultation role. As the world becomes overpopulated and, therefore, more violent, altruism-based models become critical. They can serve as a valuable antidote to a culture of hopelessness and submission to violence and corruption.

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